Occupational licensure, one of the most significant labor market regulations in the United States, may restrict the interstate movement of workers. We analyze the interstate migration of 22 licensed occupations. Using an empirical strategy that controls for unobservable characteristics that drive long-distance moves, we find that the between-state migration rate for individuals in occupations with state-specific licensing exam requirements is 36 percent lower relative to members of other occupations. Members of licensed occupations with national licensing exams show no evidence of limited interstate migration. The size of this effect varies across occupations and appears to be tied to the state specificity of licensing requirements. We also provide evidence that the adoption of reciprocity agreements, which lower re-licensure costs, increases the interstate migration rate of lawyers. Based on our results, we estimate that the rise in occupational licensing can explain part of the documented decline in interstate migration and job transitions in the United States.
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Introduction
Occupational licensing has become one of the most significant forms of labor market regulation in the United States. About 25 percent of the workforce requires a license to work; in 1950, that figure was only 5 percent (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016; Krueger 2010, 2013) . Proponents of occupational licensing contend that it protects consumers, ensuring high service quality and protecting the public from harm by making sure that all service providers have attained a minimum qualification level. By requiring such qualifications, however, occupational licensing may also restrict entry and limit the mobility of individuals in these occupations. The jurisdiction-specific nature of licensing also may limit the ability of workers to move to take advantage of job opportunities, and may limit the wage growth and employment of members of licensed occupations by restricting their geographic mobility. We provide new and more comprehensive detailed evidence of the influence of occupational licensing on reducing the interstate migration of licensed workers. These results suggest that reducing some of these restrictions has the potential to enhance labor market fluidity, increase the efficiency of the labor market, and raise the earnings of regulated workers.
Economists have long recognized the ability of workers to move to different labor markets without restriction as fundamental to the efficient functioning of those markets (Smith 1776; Friedman 1962) . Most occupational licenses are granted at the state level, 1 and often the cost of attaining licensure in another state can be significant, even for those already licensed in another state. If the rise in occupational licensing restricts interstate mobility, it potentially subjects a growing share of the labor force to barriers to mobility 2 and subsequent wage growth. In this study, we show that individuals in a variety of licensed occupations, ranging from high income and education professions to blue-collar trades, move across states at a significantly lower rate than others, although the size of this reduction varies substantially across occupations. Our empirical strategy exploits the detailed migration information available in the American Community Survey (ACS) to control for unobservable characteristics of licensed occupation members that influence the probability of moving a long distance. We show that occupations with state-specific licensing requirements, such as exams, experience the largest reductions in interstate migration, whereas the interstate mobility of occupations requiring passage of a national exam for licensure is generally no lower than that of others. We provide additional evidence of a causal link between state licensing requirements to the interstate migration of lawyers. We provide approximations of the earnings growth of licensed individuals arising from their reduced incentives to move across states.
Despite the growing importance of occupational licensing, the existing literature investigating the link between occupational licensing and geographic mobility is sparse.
Using data from the 1950 census, Holen (1965) showed that dentists and lawyers have limited between-state mobility relative to physicians. Pashigian (1979) 
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Our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical framework relating occupational licensing and geographic mobility. Section 3 describes our data.
Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy, and Section 5 presents our results, including tests of the robustness of our results and the causal model for lawyers. In Section 6 we summarize, conclude, and present directions for future research.
Modeling Occupational Licensing and Geographic Mobility
The potential restrictive effect of occupational licensing on interstate migration can be modeled using classic models of migration decision making developed by Sjaastad (1962) . In these models, an individual decides whether to migrate based on expected utility differences (usually modeled as a function of wages or trade-offs of wages for other nonpecuniary items) between the origin and destination. They migrate if, given their beliefs, they have a higher expected utility from migrating than from not migrating:
While expected utility is a function of wages in the origin and destination ( and , respectively), migrating also incurs a cost . 
Data
For our empirical analysis, we rely on the ACS as available through IPUMS-USA (Ruggles 2017). As the largest nationally representative survey that contains detailed migration and occupation measures, as well as other information, the ACS is the existing dataset most suited to studying the relationship between licensing coverage and 6 migration. 3 We use the ACS from 2005 to 2015 for our main analyses because these years contain more detailed migration information than is available in earlier years.
Since we are interested in the migration of currently employed and employable individuals, we limit our sample to those aged 18 to 65. The data available through the ACS only have information on occupational licensing coverage, but not if the individual attained a license (Gittleman and Kleiner 2016) .
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The 22 licensed occupations we examine are shown in Table 1 . We chose these occupations based on the following criteria: (1) they were uniquely identifiable using ACS occupation codes, (2) they were universally licensed in all states, and (3) entry into the occupation requires licensure, so all members of an occupation must be licensed. All of these occupations require passage of at least one exam to attain licensure. We use the structure of this exam to divide the occupations into two categories: occupations for which the content and passing standards of the licensing exam vary across states, and those for which the main licensing exam is a national exam with a single passing standard. We refer to the former group as "state-specific" licensed occupations and the latter as "quasi-national" licensed occupations. 5 Some occupations with similar tasks, such as occupational and physical therapists, were merged by combining two or more ACS occupation categories to increase the sample size. These 22 licensed occupations cover a wide variety of employment types, from low to high income and education, and 3 The address-based sampling design of the Current Population Survey (CPS) unfortunately limits its usefulness in studying the relationship between migration and licensing because movers are not followed over time. 4 The ACS has a weakness of only identifying current occupation; consequently, we only observe occupation of migrants after their move. We discuss in detail the implications of our results in Section 4. 5 More details on the rationale for classification of occupations as quasi-national and state-specific are shown in Appendix 
Empirical Strategy
We estimate the relationship between being a member of a licensed occupation and interstate migration using the following model: 
where is now an indicator for moving far within a state, and all other variables are defined as in equation .2. Similarly, we expect ( , ) ≠ 0, and therefore our estimate ̂, to also suffer from selection bias. However, as members of licensed occupations do not need to become re-licensed when they move within a state, = 0.
Therefore, ̂ identifies the bias resulting from correlation between the probability of making a far move and being a member of a licensed occupation. Consider the following expression for the error term : 
where (•) is the bias resulting from that component. Note that both and are also components of the error term in the interstate migration equation,
as they also influence the probability of moving between states. Therefore, we have this expression for �̂� if we also assume ( , ) = 0:
and �̂� − �̂� identifies if ( ) = ( ) and ( ) = ( ). Each of these bias terms contains three elements: (1) In addition to the assumptions discussed above, the ability of the "difference"
estimator �̂� − �̂� to identify also relies on the additional assumptions of no correlation between and the remaining parts of each error term ( and ) . These assumptions are likely to not hold, as there are potentially other unobserved factors correlated with licensing status that affect the likelihood of migration, whether between states or within a state, that are not captured by and . We therefore do not claim that �̂� − �̂� identifies a causal effect of licensure on interstate migration, but this difference estimator is likely "closer" to this effect than the estimate of
We face an additional issue in estimating the effect of re-licensure costs on interstate migration from the content of the ACS dataset. Our key independent variable is defined based on current reported occupation, and our dependent variables are measures of migration in the past year. The ACS does not contain information on an individual's occupation last year (i.e., prior to their move). Therefore, individuals currently in licensed occupations in the ACS consist of two groups: individuals who were also employed in that occupation last year ("continuing" members of the occupation) and individuals who were not ("new entrants" into the occupation). Therefore, and do not solely identify the effect of re-licensure cost on migration (as they would if we could condition on last year's occupation), but instead are a combination of this effect (the difference in migration rates between continuing members of licensed occupations and other occupations) and the difference in migration rates between new entrants into licensed occupations and new entrants into other occupations.
We have previously described the predicted relationship between re-licensure costs Assuming that other incentives to migrate for new entrants operate similarly across licensed and unlicensed occupations (and/or differences in these incentives are effectively "differenced out" using the between-far difference estimator), we expect new entrants in licensed occupations to have higher interstate migration rates relative to new entrants in unlicensed occupations, as they have a stronger incentive to move across states because of varying initial licensure costs, but this difference in incentives does not exist for within-state moves. This means our estimate of the effect of licensure on interstate migration is a combination of a negative effect for continuing members of licensed occupations and a positive effect for new entrants. Therefore, our estimator �̂� − �̂� is biased upward by the presence of new entrants in our sample.
We can provide some suggestive evidence on the size and presence of this bias by using data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS ASEC). While not a panel dataset, the ASEC records both the current occupation of individuals as well as their occupation one year ago. As the data contains the occupation before and after a move for those who moved in the last year, we can identify new entrants into occupations as well as continuing members, and therefore calculate the fraction of new entrants into occupations by their migration status. The CPS migration question allows us to distinguish three types of migration for those who moved: moves within a county, moves between counties within the same state, and moves between states. 
Results
We estimate our difference estimator E�δ � B � − E�δ � F � by simultaneously estimating models (2) and (3), clustering our standard errors on last year's state of residence. As we use linear probability models, the coefficients are percentage point changes, which are not directly comparable across the two models because of differences in the mean of the dependent variable (only about 1 percent of the population moves far within a state, whereas approximately 3 percent of the population moves between states within a year).
We therefore convert our estimates to percentage effects by dividing them by the estimated value of the constant in their respective model and multiplying by 100, and we use the simultaneous estimation to calculate standard errors. We first estimate our model for all licensed occupations and the two licensed occupation groups (state-specific and quasi-national) and provide evidence that our results are robust to changes in the definition of far moves. We then explore the heterogeneity in effects across occupations and show more direct links between licensing policies and the interstate migration of lawyers.
Results by licensing group
Our main results are shown in (2) and (3) repeat the analysis for the state-specific licensed occupations and the quasi-national licensed occupations, respectively. The results are very different for the two different groups: the relative interstate migration rate of state-specific licensed occupations is 36 percent lower than that of others, whereas that of quasi-national licensed occupations is 5 percent higher. A more direct comparison of the two groups is shown in Column (4), which compares state-licensed occupations to quasi-national licensed occupations (i.e., the "treatment" group is state-licensed occupations, and the comparison group is quasi-national occupations, with others excluded from the sample). In this case, all members of the sample are subject to occupational licensing, but individuals in licensed occupations with state-specific exam requirements move at a 31 percent lower rate between states than those with national exams. However, they also move far within a state at a 15 percent lower rate, which is evidence that clientele and network-based aspects of these occupations may play a significant role in limiting migration of these occupations out of their local area. After accounting for these estimates, the relative migration rates of state-specific licensed occupations between states are still 16 percent lower than those of quasi-national licensed occupations.
Robustness to MIGPUMA definitions
The ability of our estimation strategy to identify the effect of licensing on interstate migration relies on our measure of far within-state migration (moving between nonadjacent MIGPUMAs within a state) being a good proxy for a move that corresponds with both a job change and a move out of one's local area. To implement a robustness check for how sensitive our results are to the definition of a MIGPUMA, we exploit the fact that these definitions changed as a result of the 2010 census. 
Occupation-specific analysis
As state requirements for licensure are unique to each occupation, we expect substantial variation in the effects of licensure on interstate migration across occupations, even within the state-specific and quasi-national categories, especially as these classifications are based on only the exam requirement. We investigate the heterogeneity across occupations in the effect of licensing on interstate migration by repeating our analysis separately for the 22 occupations listed in Table 1 . In these specifications, the indicator is replaced by an indicator for belonging to one of the listed occupations (i.e., ℎ , , etc.). In some of the specifications, we also set a minimum education, as many occupations require a minimum education level to enter.
For example, we limit the sample for the physician education level to those with at least a bachelor's degree, since including those with lower education levels in the comparison group for such a highly educated profession are likely errors in the data. 15 All other control variables are the same as in our main analysis.
Results for the state-specific licensed occupations are shown in Table 6 . There are large differences across occupations in the relative between-state migration rate. Tables 6 and 7 . 16 In many states, only teachers employed by public schools have to be licensed. Unfortunately, the industry and occupation codes in the ACS do not allow distinction of public school teachers from other teachers. Our estimate of the effect of licensing on migration of teachers is therefore likely to be upwardly biased, as the migration decisions of private school teachers should not be affected by licensing. 17 The lower far migration rate for teachers is likely not a result of a network or clientele effect, but instead likely a result of the loss of benefits specific to school districts, such as tenure, pensions, and seniority within union contracts. Perhaps surprising is the fact that lawyers appear to not suffer from this clientele effect, as they move at a higher rate and far distance within the state. However, many lawyers work for corporations, as public defendants, or district attorneys, or they work for large law firms, where development of a local clientele and network is less important. 
Lawyer reciprocity and between-state migration
Ten states adopted reciprocity agreements for lawyers between 2001 and 2015. As of 2015, 7 states had no such agreement, and the remaining 34 states already had reciprocity agreements in place in 2001. The introduction of reciprocity potentially increases the ability of lawyers to migrate to a state, as the barriers to re-licensure are much lower. We test whether this is the case using the following specification:
where is an indicator for moving between states in the last year for individual residing in state in year , is an indicator for being a lawyer, is an indicator for having a reciprocity agreement in place, and , × , and are as in equation (2). The adoption of a reciprocity agreement for lawyers should only affect the migration of lawyers, so is the key coefficient of interest. We use this differencein-difference (DID) strategy to examine both in-migration and out-migration of lawyers to and from states that adopt reciprocity agreements. In-migration specifications define the reciprocity variable using the current state of residence, and out-migration uses last year's state of residence. We repeat the analysis for three different control samples: all individuals with at least a bachelor's degree (the sample used in the main analysis), as well as all licensed individuals (defined using members of the 22 occupations in Table 1) and state-specific licensed individuals with this minimum level of education. As these individuals also face a potential barrier to migration from licensing, they are likely a more appropriate comparison group for lawyers.
Results are shown in Table 8 . The in-migration of lawyers increases by 0.004 percentage points after the introduction of a reciprocity agreement, approximately 15 percent relative to all licensed individuals and 20 percent relative to state-specific licensed individuals. In the out-migration specifications, none of the coefficients are significant, although the point estimates on the migration of lawyers after the introduction of reciprocity are positive using the licensed and state-specific licensed samples. The lower half of Table 8 shows the results of tests of differences in pre-trends between the migration rates of lawyers and the comparison group in the three years prior to the adoption of a reciprocity agreement. The p-value for the test of joint significance for these three coefficients is not above conventional thresholds for statistical significance, indicating no difference in pre-trends for the two groups in all three specifications.
The in-migration of lawyers increases into states that adopt reciprocity agreements relative to that of other licensed occupations, but there is little evidence of an effect on out-migration of members of that occupation.
Difficulty of re-licensure: the bar exam
One of the major components of lawyer licensure is the bar exam. All lawyers must pass this state-specific exam, and the content and difficulty vary significantly across states. To investigate whether the difficulty of a state's bar exam is related to the movement of lawyers, we use information from the American Bar Association on ABAapproved law schools' median LSAT scores (the law school entrance exam) and state bar passage rates to form a state "bar difficulty index." We form this index by regressing bar passage rates on school median LSAT scores and year and state fixed effects using data from 2011 to 2015, the only years available, weighted by the number of bar takers from each school. The index is expressed in standard deviation units, ranging from -3.13 (Alaska) to 2.18 (California).
Bar exam difficulty should only affect the migration of lawyers who must take it to become licensed in that state. As mentioned in the previous section, by 2015 all but seven states have some form of reciprocity agreement in place for lawyers. The existence of these agreements means that not all lawyers licensed elsewhere have to take a state's bar exam to become licensed. To qualify for licensure under these agreements, lawyers have to be licensed in a particular state and have been practicing lawyers for a minimum number of years (usually three out of the last five, five of the last seven, or similar requirements). Using the member states of current reciprocity agreements and practice requirements from a guide published by the ABA and NCBE, we identify individuals who likely must take a state's bar exam for licensure using the current and last year's state of residence and age. 19 We therefore limit our sample to include only lawyers and explore the relationship between our index and the migration of lawyers using the following specification:
where is an indicator for likely having to take the bar for licensure in that state, is our bar difficulty index, and other variables are the same as in equation (2). As we have no time variation in the bar index, 20 we cannot include state 19 We use the median age of law school graduation reported by the ABA (26) and make the assumption that a law school graduate has practiced every year since graduation. So to satisfy a three of the last five years requirement, we assume an individual must be at least 29 years old. We also use information on the Uniform Bar Exam (UBE), which has been adopted by 18 states since its introduction in 2011. 20 Indices computed using individual years of data varied greatly from year to year (while relative bar difficulty likely does not) because of the small number of observations for many states-hence our creation of only one index from five years of data.
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fixed effects in our specification. Our coefficient of interest is , which measures the effect of bar exam difficulty on the migration of lawyers who likely have to take the bar exam for licensure relative to lawyers who likely do not.
Results are shown in Table 9 . 
Potential Economic Consequences
Occupational licensing's limiting effect on interstate migration has potential implications for the earnings growth of individuals in licensed occupations, and the rise of this form of labor market regulation may explain part of the decrease in interstate migration and job transitions since 1980. To gauge the size of these effects, we perform some simulations using our estimates, and the results are shown in Tables 10 and 11 . 
Conclusion
We examined to what extent occupational licensing may be a contributing factor to the general decline in interstate migration. We compared the relative within-and between-state migration rates of members of 22 licensed occupations to those of others using data from the American Community Survey. Our empirical strategy compared the relationship between licensure and migration between states and a far distance within state, which controls for unobservable characteristics that influence the propensity of licensed occupations to move out of their local area. First, we found that migration across states for licensed individuals is reduced, but the size of the reduction varies across occupations. Quasi-nationally licensed occupations do not show any limitations on their interstate geographic mobility. Second, using a causal model with reciprocity agreements for lawyers, we find evidence that the adoption of these agreements increases the migration of lawyers into a state.
Economists have long held that restrictions on geographic mobility limit the ability of the labor market to operate efficiently. Within this context, occupational licensing provisions that restrict job entry through interstate migration could also be a barrier to economic opportunity and labor market efficiency. Specifically, the paper has empirically examined whether occupational licensing statutes limiting occupational entry from other states influence interstate migration.
The results of our estimates have implications for public policy and law. For example, in 1941, the U.S. Supreme Court held against a California statute, making it illegal to restrict indigent individuals from migrating to the state during the Great Depression.
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The Court ruled that the California statute "prevent[ed] a citizen because he was poor from seeking new horizons in other States (Roback 1943) . In this way, limits on occupational entry might essentially withhold the ability to migrate from large segments of the population.
Our analysis examines the migration of individuals. For many, migration is not an individual decision; instead, it is a choice made on the basis of overall household or family well-being. As our analysis is limited to the individuals we observe in an occupation after their move, we miss a potentially important effect of licensure on those 
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labor force entirely as a result of moving between states. An example is so-called trailing spouses-those who move because their partner obtains a better job in another state. And if these spouses were in a licensed occupation prior to the move, they may have to switch careers as a result. The effect of licensure on career changes or labor force exits made as a result of household migration is potentially important, and because we cannot identify individuals affected by these phenomena in the ACS, we leave their analysis for future research.
While our main empirical strategy helps control for unobservable differences driving migration patterns, we can only provide causal evidence using differences in state licensing policy for one occupation. As additional statutory data on licensing become available, researchers should develop additional causal models between the changes in occupational licensing statutes and its influence on interstate migration for additional occupations. Table 2 ; sample in column (4) includes only licensed occupations listed in Table 1 . All specifications include state x year fixed effects, and controls for income, race, sex, education, marital status, age, and citizenship status. Percent differences calculated as (coefficient/constant)*100. Estimation uses sample weights and is performed using OLS and simultaneous estimation of moved between and moved far specifications. [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] ; Panel C excludes all individuals reporting residence in the northeast census division (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont) in the current or last year. All specifications include state x year fixed effects, and controls for income, race, sex, education, marital status, age, and citizenship status. Percent differences calculated as (coefficient/constant)*100. Estimation uses sample weights and is performed using OLS and simultaneous estimation of moved between and moved far specifications. Samples for the following occupations limited by education: optometrists (high school degree or more) nurses, occupational and physical therapists, physician assistants, podiatrists (some college or more), physicians, dentists, psychologists, veterinarians (bachelor's degree or more). All specifications include state x year fixed effects, and controls for income, race, sex, education, marital status, age, and citizenship status. Percent differences calculated as (coefficient/constant)*100. Estimation uses sample weights and is performed using OLS and simultaneous estimation of moved between and moved far specifications. (2) 64 who were observed for at least one year prior to and after making one of the three categories of move, made no other move of any category during the SIPP panel, and were employed in a licensed occupation within one year of their move. New entrants are not employed in the same occupation in the year prior to a move. P-value shown is that for the test that the difference in the fraction of new entrants among those who move between states and those who move between counties is zero.
